Certainly it would be foolish to posit, in a species as wily and mendacious as our own, something like a primitive, irreducible will to truth-and Kant does not do so. And if the will to truth which regulates the procedures of pure speculative reason is to be founded in practical reason, this certainly does not mean that the will to truth is sustained by some presumed evidence of its utility for human nature, that is, for sensuous human nature lured by pleasures, afflicted with the phantasm, the phantom goal, of happiness.
The mind thinks on command, but it is commanded to be in command.
The law is, in Kant's formulation, that one should act in such a way that the maxim represented for your will is universal and necessary. The mind has to believe then that the representations of principle it presents can activate the will in life's organs and operations. The will energized by sensuous representations is activated from without. For although what lured the will in a sensuous representation is the promise of pleasure it seems to contain, and thus something inward, yet this pleasure is represented as consequent upon contact with something exterior.
And the will released by sensuous representations is a will activated by particulars. By the here and the now, the contingent. To such an externally ignited, flickering will the sense of law opposes a will activated by principles its own representational faculty puts to it, and activated by the universal and necessary, a vital will thus activated always and in all circumstances, always in act-an ideal being of the will.
Law commands first an inner transformation of the dependent, intermittent, servile human will, that wants, into a self-sustaining, self-maintaining ideal will, that orders.
The Types of Lawfulness

But does
such an ideal state of the will in fact exist? Mo one knows. One can give no example.
There is no way of determining whether, in any given case, someone who appears to be acting against his own interests and tastes, and in obedience to an inward representation of principle, is not in reality being activated by unperceived external stimuli or unconscious internal drives.
In any given case of ray own life, there is no way of determining whether, when I represented only the principle to my will, and acted in conformity with what the principle demanded, that was not a mere coincidence, and my psychophysical apparatus was not in reality being activated by imperceptible external processes or unconscious internal impulses. There is, in general, no observation of causality, and, in particular, neither observation of, nor comprehension of, the noumenal causality by which a pure representation of principle could activate the will and the nervous circuitry and musculature of my phenomenal body. Yet I am obligated by the law to imagine myself so constituted that the practical employment of reason would be possible, that I could believe that my psychophysical apparatus could act solely in obedience to law.
Imagination
is required--a certain usage of the imagination is required in every case of an action framed in obedience to law. The law is an imperative laid on me; it commands me to frame my psychophysical existence into a succession of positions and actions in the empirical world that would be instances of what is universal and necessary. Syntheses have to be made of the pure idea of the law and the representations of the particularities of the each time contingent situation. For these syntheses, made in advance of the act, one needs what Kant calls "types n --procedures of the imagination to produce a general image. The types are general matrices, like the schemata framed in the theoretical use of reason, but they are practical; they are fabricated to serve as guides in practical judgment. The types have to be constructed by the imagination because, Kant has said, there really is no perception of any visible action done by anyone in the world that could reliably be taken to have been framed out of obedience to law, and that could be generalized to serve as a model. In Kant's models the intuitive content is derived not from perceptible human acts, but from the behavior of physical objects, the structure of an instrumental complex, and the operation of the body politic.
A first type derives from the image of the lawregulated clockwork of physical nature.
A nature-an object as determined by the natural sciences, or nature as a whole-is a system of elements regulated by universal and necessary laws, the laws of nature. One is to imagine oneself making oneself natural-willfully putting an end to the exception, the anomaly, that one's psychophysical apparatus, operating arbitrarily, for its own pleasure, has been. Act in such a way that the maxim put to your will could be represented as a natural law, a universal and necessary law of nature.
The mind is indeed obligated to constitute for itself an objective representation of nature, that is, not a re-presentation of the phenomenal forms that came to birth and die away, but a representation of the external universe as composed of objects which are natures, and which compose nature as a totality determined through universal and necessary laws. This theoretical, or pure, employment of reason is commanded by the moral imperative: the mind finds itself obligated to construct an objective representation of the phenomenal field because it is obligated to represent the world for itself in such a way that it could make sense to be obedient to law in one's operations in that world. What makes the objective representation of nature binding is not its transcendent truth, its conformity with the facts of the things in themselves, but its conformity with the fact of the inner imperative.
In reality to move from the pure sentiment of respect for the imperative to an understanding that the imperative is an imperative for law already requires a certain usage of pure reason. The properties of lawthe formal properties of universality and necessity-¬ are learned from the formal logic that regulates the theoretical employment of reason in the construction of an objective representation of nature. Logic is used to pass from the primal intellectual feeling of being under an imperative to the understanding that the imperative is an imperative for the universal and the necessary in the practical employment of reason. The imagination commanded by this logic represents the universality and necessity which constitute the form of all nature as a force commanding us to naturalize ourselves.
But is not the agitation produced by sensuous appetites precisely action regulated by universal and necessary laws-those of psychophysiology?
To be sure, but there the mind produces representations not of the law in the objects of those appetites, but of the pleasure.
The imperative incumbent on the mind requires that one be mobilized exclusively by law. That means that one must no longer take the objects of the external world sensuously represented as termini, as ends in which the will comes to rest, but as means only, an instrumental system that in no way imposes itself or its order on the will. One must not take one's own rational faculty as a means to be put to the service of, and be commanded by, one's own sensuously represented composite nature. The way to not do that is to imagine the whole of external nature, and of one's own sensuous nature, to exist as means only and not as ends also, as material, a pure medley of sensuous material, to be ordered by the decrees of the rational agent, and to imagine that rational agency in oneself already existing as a terminus. Kant formulates this type in the words: Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means. The action, he explains, has to be conceived only negatively.
It is not: act so as to make your existence the end of all material nature; rather it is: never act against the unconditional worth, or dignity, of your own rational will, never subordinate its existence to any object-or to that sensuous object which is your composite material nature.
The will that commands us to represent objects no longer according to the promise of pleasure with which our sensibility represents them, but only according to the universal and necessary laws with which our pure reason represents them, does not have our own welfare, our survival, in mind by thus excluding from view the seductive conceits of pleasure, the mirage of happiness.
But yet we can note that an organism that would naturalize itself so as to live in a world of necessity and not in a world of pleasures would no doubt survive, and survive more surely. This would be a sort of anthropological dividend, a species dividend, of individual rationality.
When one acts one is then not to act to appropriate external goods, one is not to act as a predator; one's action is not to be commanded by the particular lacks and contingent wants of one's own nature. One is not to act to make oneself a producer, producing out of the material of nature new substances containing pleasures for one's own sensuous nature. Capitalist action, to produce new needs and new wants in our material and happiness-obsessed given nature, is interdicted by the moral imperative. Action in nature is also not to be conceived as gratuitous-whether as undertaken in order to proliferate dreams and dances in the utilitarian world of things that are means only and not ends also, or to make a dream or a dance out of one's own material nature. Action in nature is not to be conceived as care-as though the ends of nature, of that which grows of itself, could command our will. Rather rational man is obligated to imagine himself as master of nature, sovereign over nature, whose action in nature-and on his own nature-reduces entirely to executive acts, enjoining the layout of external material to everywhere embody the rational decrees formulated within his own subject mind.
But do in fact the real actions one will execute gear into and effect modifications in the layout of things in nature? How could one be assured of any con-cordance between the release of the noumenal causality of the rational will with the layout of the things in themselves whose appearances we represent to ourselves as regulated by the universal and necessary laws of objectivity?
Could it not remain forever possible that when we believe we have activated our will by a representation of principle contrived by thought alone, and believe that this will has activated the nervous circuitry and musculature of our bodies, and perceive effects in the external field that seem to be consequent upon that movement and to be in conformity with the principle we had formulated, this is not in fact but a coincidence, and that we are gratuitously believing in causality where there is only the succession of the toady retinue of our own subjective impressions? Yet we have to believe that it could make sense for us to command our will to realize rationally commanded arrangements in external nature; we find ourselves obligated to believe in a noumenal or ontological destination of the instrumentalities of nature to the decrees of rational volition. We are obligated to postulate the existence of God, creative designer of the kingdom of nature as well as of the ideal realm of the will, in order to be able to believe that such action could be possible, could be real.
The things subject to the noumenal causality of our will have to be imagined as means only-but not means for us to become masters over nature, nor means to satisfy the wants and needs of our nature. They are means for the realization of the ordinances of our rational will. Our sovereignty then consists not in satisfying our nature, but in commanding all nature. It consists in constraining all nature to manifest the laws of our will, but a will upon which the universality and necessity of nature weighs, weighs alone and imperatively.
It will be an analogy with the functioning of civil society that will enable us to imagine this imperative inner ordinance. Rational man must imagine his own inner constitution after the constitution of a political entity that comes to exist and act on its own, not by repudiating the decrees of the mother country or foreign imperial power and disowning all law, but rather by setting up for itself a legislative faculty to dictate its own laws. Rational man must similarly imagine that the existence of his own will-or its freedom-consists in being bound by laws that are formulated by his own faculty of thought, and not by the laws in effect in external material nature in which his substance is embedded, nor by those that regulate the forces of his psychophysical nature.
It is of course not true that one perceives oneself as author of law; law is from the first incumbent on the mind, affects, afflicts the mind, is imposed on the affectivity or the sensibility of the mind, and is not conceived, that is, posited in a synthetic a priori judgment. One is not the source of the authority of law in the universe of one's own representation; one rather willfully makes oneself into the locus where cosmic law is articulated and promulgated.
But, Kant says, one must, like a citizen in a republic, act as if-one must imagines-one were obeying only laws one had decreed for oneself.
And for others. One is commanded to command oneself, but also to command others and to be commanded by them.
The very sense of the other, not only another shape of sensuous material, a physico-chemical apparatus, but a being one can interact with because he is an agent, is the sense of a will in him energized by representations of his own conception. The movements of an organism can also visibly be activated by stimuli affecting it from the outside, or by anonymous impulses arising within. The other exists on his own by activating himself with his own representations, representations not only presenting again or in advance external contingencies, but formulating the exigency for law within. To perceive the other is to sense the law that the other imposes on himself. To recognize the other is to respect the other. Respect for others is not respect for their innate composite human nature, but respect for the law that rules in them.
Respect is distinguished by Kant from admiration, admiration for the force of perfection of the tangible vital powers in another, which resembles the sentiment of the sublime in physical nature.
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The sense of the other as a person is the perception of the action of another as instantiating a law which is valid for me also.
Thus the others concern me, for the principles that govern their actions obligate me too.
And, on the other hand, it enters into the very meaning of my own sovereignty that the law that I propose as a maxim for my own practical moves in the phenomenal sphere is a law I legislate for everyone. Acting morally consists in not taking oneself as an exception.* It is to not class oneself among deviants and monsters.
It is to make one's moves such that they not only can be understood with the principles common to all reason, but set forth principles binding on all. It is to make every move of one's life exemplary.
Concretely this means that action, each gesture, each word, corresponds to a nature represented objectively, in universal and necessary laws, and not to a nature sensuously represented according to the promise of any private pleasure it seems to contain. The existence that the law commands is a commanding existence; it consists in deciding the law with each of one's gestures and moves. Thoughtful existence does not simply obey norms; it acts always to make itself the norm. Each of one's actions becomes juridical; one acts so as to formulate the law for everyone. Sovereign existence is an existence not only without particular, private interests, but without privacy, an existence through and through promulgating.
Exemplar!ty and Veracity
Moral existence is defined, negatively, as the elimination of the vices of lying, avarice, that is, subjection to material means, and servility.' Positively, it consists first and essentially in honorableness, in veracity, in exemplary publicness.* The command of the categorical imperative is to conceive of the maxim of one's own will as a public law; the test of evil maxims is that they have to be kept from public view.
Through secrecy one aims at a private life of one's own, which is the direct contrary of autonomous personality.
Through dissimulation from others and from oneself one makes oneself "a mere deceptive appearance of a man."* Kant cites "even the wish of a lover to find nothing but good qualities in his beloved (which) makes him oblivious to her obvious faults;" such "insincerity in one's declarations, practised against oneself, deserves the strongest censure," as is formulated in Scripture, where the original evil and source of all evil is not the fratricide of Cain, but the first lie.' Truthfulness devolves not from the material value of truth for theoretical subjectivity, but from the essentially public, exemplary, existence the moral imperative imposes.
It then belongs to the essence of the rational existence that it sovereignly enter into relationship with others.
The kingdom-or republic-of ends is formed by internal bonds, it must not be conceived as simple coexistence of free and equal members, where the tangency of their spheres of sovereignty would be "due to the roundness of the earth" 7 -as though if the surface of the earth were an infinite plane men could be so dispersed that community would not be a necessary consequence of their existence on it." The society of sovereign legislators must not be imagined as an association through mutual aid, for the reasoned gratification of wants is no longer the motivation of the will among them. Their very rationality is not constituted through mutual aid, as though the consciousness of each could only represent the particular and the contingent, and the representation of the universal and necessary truth could only be constructed by the assemblage of all these particularities and contingencies. Their society is not an association for mutual protection-although, it is true, civil society is first formed in order to guarantee to these lords over nature their sovereign possession of the earth and all its goods, against those who exist in a state of nature; they are indeed obligated to constrain all those in the state of nature to enter civil society, and presumably have at one point formed military asso-324 ciations for this purpose. Yet this motivation does not maintain or define the association of sovereign ones. And their society should not be imagined to exist for production.
If these purely rational agents no longer recognize their own happiness as an incentive, they shall also not associate for a productivity that endlessly produces new desires and wants. The kingdom of ends is also not to be imagined after the model of an artist community, whether that which exists for the sake of producing artworks, Balinese, Newari or Nuba societies, or that which makes itself an artwork-the Samurai, the Jesuit order, the Prussian military caste (Nietzsche's examples).
In as a means to become shallower and weaker. The negativity in terms of which consciousness formulates itself to force the recognition of the other appeals to the will to power in the other, the will to enslave in the other. This is not to be equated with respect for the other; to respect the other is to respect the law that rules in the other: his law, his own destiny. The will to position oneself in the eyes of the others as demand is already a will to be enslaved, the will to make oneself servile. Consciousness articualtes the imperative laid on oneself into demands put on' the other. But the imperative precedes consciousness and does not have as its function to make consciousness possible.
The imperative is not an imperative of the species, of human nature, but of nature. The imperative force of nature is felt in the measure that the monstrous insipidity of man as the measure of the value of things, as judge of the world, man as a "world-negating" principle is exposed.
"We"-Nietzsche says--"laugh as soon as we encounter the juxtaposition of 'man and world', separated by the sublime presumption of the little word 'and'." it is neither perfect nor beautiful, nor noble, nor does it wish to become any of these things . . ."'* To uncover pure nature through a negative labor of de-idealization, de-aestheticization, de-moralization, de-deification Nietzsche fixes as the scientific task of the age.
Positively
the essence of all nature is disclosed in the formula of the eternal return of all things, the law which formulates the pure flux of becoming, the irremediable temporality of all things. It is not just a formula, formed by the synthesizing powers of the mind and that can be comprehended by the mind; it is a force, and crushes, or transforms the soul that is forced to contain it. Every life which is in any way negating with regard to itself, resentful and rancorous, regretful and remorseful, or apprehensive, anxious or hopeful with regard to any of its own states, will feel itself subjected to the irremediableness of all that comes to pass, and sealed in the most desperate kind of despair, that from which the hope for nothingness is taken, that for which suicide is the most illusory kind of cure. The law is incumbent on me; it is a singular, singularizing law, that makes human existence as such, species existence, impossible. Species existence made possible by the fundamental logico-ontological errors is now seen to have been promulgated in order to give lie to, in order to be the lie that covers over, the truth of the eternal return of all things.
The Nietzschean genealogy of morals shows that the aesthetic, religious, theological and scientific representations of the universe in which species existence is installed are contrived by an essentially and increasingly ascetic intellect; the Nietzschean psychology shows that the will's ill will against itself and against time idealized in the aesthetic, philosophic, sacred, sacerdotal and scientific epochs of species history is made imperative in order to give lie to the law of the irremissible becoming, coming from nowhere, going nowhere, of the forces in all forms.
But upon the life that is powerful enough to be able to endure it, the law of eternal return functions to bind imperatively that life to itself, to make it necessary for itself. Every impulse of life turned on the fragments, riddles, dreadful accidents of which its course is composed will become possible only on condition that it is unrestrictedly willed, willed with a will without reservations, without claims, demands or appeals, a will that wills itself without limit. I shall henceforth be able to execute an action only on condition that I can will it without reservation, to the point of willing its infinite reiteration; I shall henceforth be able to feel any feeling only on condition that I can discharge all my forces into it without recompense; I shall henceforth be able to suffer any suffering only on condition that I can die in and of this suffering without regret or pity. The law imperatively makes the soul make itself necessary for itself; it makes it make the singular contingencies-the frag-ments, riddles, dreadful accidents-of which it is made imperative for itself.
The soul under the imperative of the law is not motivated by the lure of pleasure, that is, contentment, "wretched contentment," wants nothing and demands nothing of the earth or its gods, is not driven by a will for power. Its will is power, and has the power to will itself unremittingly.
It does not will anything other than itself, dees not strive to constitute itself into an exemplar or statute for the genus, does not strive, long for or demand. It sovereignly wills the discontinuous impulses that build and intensify and need only to pass, to discharge themselves, these gratuitious and fortuitous impuses of its existence, as necessary for itself, and makes them necessary by the unrestricted adhesion of will in them.
The Power to be Veridical
The law functions to make sovereign the soul that has the force, the power to endure it; it also functions to make it truthful. Sovereignty is truthful; the very word noble signifies those who are capable of living by the truth. Their internal constitution is such that they can affirm all that is and becomes--not only the forms formed according to the fundamental logico-ontological axioms, our multiplication tables and our grammar read into things, but all that is and becomes and becomes nothing, honey and lees, drunken midnight, tombs and tomb-tears' comfort, gilded evening glow, woe, hell, hatred, disgrace, the cripple, world-"this world, 0 you know it!" 1 * The soul vast as the world, the soul able to open to the world, would have to be able to affirm itself incessantly, affirm unremittingly its own impulsive passage, all its own impulses which affront, which discharge into, all the fragments, riddles, dreadful accidents of the world. It would have to negate no will that passed in itself nor resist any will to come. Such a soul is no longer a portentous power of negativity, but wholly self-affirmation. to affirm value absolutely is not to affirm that something is an end relatively, in view of something, or in view of the rational designs of sovereign man; it is to affirm that it is an end in itself and not for us.
This soul has to learn the new Zarathustran way to "carry together into
The law functions imperatively to bind the soul to itself unreservedly, to make it unremittingly affirmative in its own inner constitution, and thus able to affirm the value of, to love all the impulses upon which the fragments, riddles and dreadful accidents of the world press; it gives the soul the power to be truthful. But is the law itself truthful?
The Truth of the Law that Imposes Veracity
Eternal recurrence is, Nietzsche says, the most scientific idea, the final idea produced by the structure of all modern science, the idea that formulates the ontological diagram of all that science knows. But Georg Simmel already in 1907 produced a model for the universe composed of a finite number of entities but destined to endure an infinity of time, which would be in continual motion and yet never return to any given position; it would be enough to set in motion on an axle three wheels turning at speeds of n, 2n and J3-. To this one could object that such a universe would be constructed out of entities, whereas the Nietzschean--the modern scientific-universe is rather constructed out of processes. Arthur Danto has then argued that every process which proceeds continually from state 0 to state n passes through a flux of transition infinitely divisible; a universe made of two such processes could proceed through an infinity of time without ever reproducing any given configuration they form. 1 * To this one might first try to object, with Heidegger, that the Nietzschean law of eternal return is an ontological and not empirical law, and can be neither confirmed or invalidated by the empirically observable.
The law of the eternal return of all things concerns the way of being of all that is, not only the objects of nature, but also the essence of the subject himself, the inner diagram of the most truthful soul.
But as a law formulating what it means for the objects of cognition-of scientific congnition-to be, to be in becoming, it is a cosmological law, or what Husserl characterizes as a law belonging to the formal and a priori ontology of nature.
Its formulation as a cosmological law is the means of access to an ontological thesis; that is why Nietzsche could determine to go to Paris to study physics for ten years in order to make himself the teacher of the law of the eternal return of all things. The Simmel and Danto arguments are not empirical determinations; they are epistemological considerations whose effect is to show that the law of eternal return is not a cosmological law built into the structure of our science. This law does not belong to the totality of all that which we know, which we determine to be true. Thus, in the midst of a mind being employed to produce a representation of nature which is phenomenal, phantasmal, false, without transcendent truth and even without anthropological, species, value, there is produced a pleasure which is deep, which is ontological, an illumination which has ontological veracity.
The progressive, optimist, theoretical culture that was contrived to supplant and to repress the tragic, prehistorical ritual culture abolished this enlightenment. But we live in a time of reminiscence; Nietzsche himself is a reminiscence of rituals long discredited and of an enlightenment long forgotten. The historical sense is the distinctive virtue and disease of our age. To many the historicism, the relativism, engendered by the historical sense is the instrument of a great impoverishment and coldness, the extinction of the old fires that illuminated the dawns of the great visionaries; to others it is the sign of stealthily approaching invalidism and the senility of a philistine theoretical civilization. But to Nietzsche the will to assemble all the history of humanity to make it our own history is the distinctive means produced by our culture for the production of power, for the passage to absolute spirit. But for that the historical sense must not be formed dialectically, retaining of the past and the bygone its meaning, depending on the dialectical fecundity of meaning to engender a future for itself, and on the dialectical assemblage of all meanings to put us in possession of all that can be. We of the present day are only just beginning to form the chain of a very powerful future feeling, link for link-we hardly know what we are doing .... Anyone who manages to experience the history of humanity as a whole as his own history will feel in an enormously generalized way all the grief of an invalid who thinks of health, of an old man who thinks of the dreams of his youth, of a lover deprived of his beloved, of the martyr whose ideal is perishing, of the hero on the evening after a battle that has decided nothing but brought him wounds and the loss of his friend.
But if one endured, if one could endure this immense sum of grief of all kinds while yet being the hero who, as the second day of battle breaks, welcomes the dawn and his fortune, being a person whose horizon encompasses thousands of years past and future, being the heir of all the nobility of all past spirit-an heir with a sense of obligation, the most aristocratic of old nobles and at the same time the first of a new nobility--the like of which no age has yet seen or dreamed of; if one could burden one's soul with all of this-the oldest, the newest, losses, hopes, conquests, and the victories of humanity; if one could finally contain all this in one soul and crowd it into a single feeling-this would surely have to result in a happiness that humanity has not known so far; the happiness of a god full of power and love, full of tears and laughter, a happiness that, like the sun in the evening, continually bestows its inexhaustible riches, pouring them into the sea, feeling richest, as the sun does, only when the poorest fisherman rows with golden oars! This godlike feeling would then be called--humanity.
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The historical sense is not a consciousness constituted by the dialectical assemblage of all the meanings of all the past deeds of mind; it is rather the feeling produced by the accumulation, the compression into one soul, of all the griefs, melancholies, despairs, One will demand now to know: How is this correspondence produced? Whether this correspondence is an exact one? How is the exactitude of the correspondence known?
The correspondence is produced by nature in our nature. The soul does not make itself truthful through an asceticism and a discipline performed on itself, through an active synthesis of all the possible affirmative forces which bear the faces and figures of every noble, that is, truthful, life of history. The soul does not make itself truthful through a productive imagination which positions it in an ideal kingdom of ends, commanding all, commanded by each. The most comprehensive soul is rather the locus of a return of atavist compulsions and long forgotten instincts. As in the tragic rituals of enlightenment, it is when the ego, sovereign legislator, or representative of the republic, is steeped in unconsciousness, drugged or intoxicated, that there is a resurgence of forces of nature in his nature.
It is to his withdrawal outside
